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1. Introduction 
In December 2008, the EU Parliament agreed on a Climate and Energy Package which is designed to 
achieve the EU’s overall environmental target of a 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and the renewable target of a 20 % share of renewables in the EU’s gross final energy 
consumption by 2020, see EU (2009a) and EU (2009b). EU (2009b) is henceforth referred to as the 
Renewables Directive, whereas the term EU’s Energy and Climate Package covers both EU (2009a) 
and EU (2009b). 
 
A green certificate system, also known as renewable portfolio standards or renewable obligations, 
requires consumers, retailers or producers to derive a certain percentage of final energy 
consumption/production from renewable sources. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the cost-
effectiveness of various designs of green certificate systems to achieve EU’s renewable target. In the 
light of our findings, we discuss EU’s adopted policy of differentiated renewable national targets 
across Member States. As the GHG reduction target is not our main focus, we assume as a starting 
point for our analysis that all GHG emissions within the EU are restricted through a uniform price on 
emission, which ensures that the GHG emission reduction target is met. 
 
According to the literature, if the goal is to secure a certain share of renewables in final consumption, a 
green certificate market provides a cost effective achievement (Bye, 2003, Haas et al., 2004, and Aune 
et al. 2008). Green certificates are currently introduced in several European countries (EU, 2008a). 
However, the literature also shows that if the purpose of the regulations is to achieve GHG emission 
reductions, a green certificate market is not the first best policy, neither alone (Palmer and Burtrow, 
2005) or in combination with an emission trading scheme (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2009, and del 
Río González, 2007).1  
 
Stimulating green energy production can of course be motivated by objectives other than GHG 
emissions reductions. EU argues that the renewable target means a boost for high-tech industries, new 
economic opportunities and jobs (EU, 2008b). It is a well known result that private markets will 
under-invest in R&D due to firms’ inability to appropriate the social returns of investment (Stoneman 
and Vickers, 1988). Hence, some kind of governmental funding of R&D may be appropriate to make 
investors internalize the positive externalities associated with R&D. These objectives could 
                                                     
1 For other studies on the performance of green certificates see, e.g. Amundsen and Nese (2009), Amundsen and Mortensen 
(2001), Morthorst (2001), Fischer (2006) and Bertoldi and Huld (2006). 
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nevertheless be met more cost effectively by R&D subsidies than by setting a fixed renewable target. 
As pointed out in Sorrell and Sijm (2003), the objectives must be explicit in order to design efficient 
policies. In this paper, we do not question whether a renewable target is a part of an efficient policy or 
the motivations for stimulating green energy production.2 We simply take the renewable target as a 
premise for our study.  
 
To achieve the target of a 20 % share of renewables in EU’s total energy consumption, the European 
Council has adopted mandatory differentiated national targets for each of the Member States. The 
national targets range from 10 % to 49 %, but are consistent with EU’s overall renewable target. 
According to the Renewable Energy Directive (EU, 2009b, article 5), the consumption of renewables 
is defined as electricity and heat produced from renewable sources, plus the consumption of other 
renewable energy sources, such as biofuels. Hence, the renewable target can be interpreted as a target 
for green energy production + net import of green energy, relative to final energy consumption. 
 
EU’s climate and energy package sets no restrictions on how countries may stimulate their green 
energy production. Currently, there is a wide range of policy instruments aimed at promoting 
renewable energy in use in the EU countries (Haas et al., 2004 and EU, 2008a). As a point of 
departure for our analysis, we consider a situation where the policy instrument to achieve the 
renewable target is a green certificate system in all countries. However, it is worth noticing that the 
market solution following from the green certificate system can be mimicked through a subsidy on 
green energy production and a tax on energy consumption under the restriction of budget neutrality 
(Aune et al., 2008, chapter 6.2).  
 
The Renewables Directive states that the Member States may meet their national renewable targets by 
financing green energy production in other countries, so-called statistical transfers. 3 The option for 
statistical transfers is a means to reduce the total cost of meeting the renewable target by distributing 
green energy production across Member States more cost effectively, compared to a situation where 
each country has to meet its target by domestic renewable energy production. It is, however, yet 
unclear to which extent this option will be utilized by the Member States. According to EU (2010), 
only 5 EU countries will rely on non-domestic measures to meet their targets, and less than 1 per cent 
                                                     
2 Although a properly designed green certificates system leads to cost-effectiveness when the policy goal is to increase the 
share of renewables, it is not an efficient instrument for correcting for externalities (see Aune et al., 2008, chapter 6.2).  
3 See article 6 of EU (2009b). 
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of the renewable production will be traded between member countries or between EU countries and 
third party countries. 
 
A potential system that fully exploits the benefit from a cost effective distribution of renewable energy 
production is an EU-wide green certificate system: All producers receive a green certificate for every 
unit green energy produced, and all consumers of energy must purchase green certificates 
corresponding to the specified share of renewable energy faced by their countries of origin.4 The EU’s 
system of statistical transfers can be seen as a first step towards a full green certificate system in the 
Community. To explore the impact of EU-wide trade, we compare a situation with full trade in green 
certificates with no trade in green certificates across Member States. Furthermore, to explore the 
impact of differentiated national renewable targets, we also consider a cost-effective policy which is 
ensured by a common renewable target for all EU members and full trade in green certificates.  
 
This leaves us with an evaluation of three different relevant policy scenarios; i) a common renewable 
target for all Member States with EU-wide trade in green certificates, ii) differentiated national targets 
for each of the Member States with EU-wide trade in green certificates, and iii) differentiated national 
targets for each of the Member States with domestic trade in certificates only. To our knowledge, the 
present paper is the only study which theoretically and empirically evaluates the cost reducing 
potential of allowing for trade in green certificates across countries by comparing these three 
scenarios.5  
 
By the use of a theoretical model, we find that the use of differentiated national targets is not a cost-
effective policy to reach a certain renewable share. This conclusion holds also when there is EU-wide 
trade in green certificates. Hence, there is an important distinction between a green certificate market 
and an emissions permit market. With tradable emissions permits, cost effectiveness is achieved (in a 
competitive market) regardless of the initial allocation of permits (Montgomery, 1972). In a green 
certificate market the consumers’ marginal costs of energy differ if the renewable targets vary across 
countries. This violates the conditions for a cost effective distribution of energy consumption. Cost-
                                                     
4 In this paper we do not discriminate between “old” and “new” renewable energy, as is done in some green certificate 
markets. Plumb and Zamfir (2009) give a comparative analysis of different green certificate markets in the EU. 
5 Aune et al. (2008) calculate the outcome of national certificate markets in the EU and compare this with a common 
certificate market in the EU. EU (2008a) and Capros et al. (2008) compare a cost-effective implementation of the renewable 
target versus national renewable targets. However, their numerical simulations differ from ours in several ways: They do not 
employ a green certificate market, which implies that they do not have financial transactions across agents through a 
certificate market. Furthermore, they introduce several restrictions on the implementation of the renewable target. For 
instance, their simulations on national renewable targets restrict the renewable share of the individual countries exactly to the 
targets in the EU proposal, which imply higher greenhouse gas emissions reductions costs than without that restriction. 
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effectiveness is only achieved by imposing a common renewable target for all countries and allowing 
for free trade in green certificates.  
 
We employ a numerical multi-market energy equilibrium model to assess the impact of the various 
designs of green certificate markets. The model simulations indicate large gains from trade in green 
certificates. Given the differentiated national targets set by the Council, the overall cost of achieving 
the EU’s renewable target can be cut by almost 70 per cent by EU-wide trade in green certificates.  
 
The efficiency loss related to differentiated targets, and hence differentiated increase in consumer 
prices across countries, is more modest. Given trade in green certificates, the EU’s total cost can be 
further reduced by almost 4 per cent by having a common renewable target compared to differentiated 
national targets (scenario (ii) versus scenario (i)). The various designs of green certificate markets 
have large impacts on the distribution of costs across countries, and not all countries are better off with 
trade. 
 
Section 0 provides our theoretical model to illustrate the qualitative results. Thereafter, in section 3, 
we present the numerical model and the results. Concluding remarks are given in section 4.  
2. The Theoretical Model 
To analyse the scenarios theoretically it is sufficient to consider a two country case. We also simplify 
the analysis by ignoring trade in energy with third countries (the numerical model provides a more 
realistic presentation of the energy market in the EU, including trade with countries outside the EU). 
Let e1 and e2 denote the consumption of energy from the two countries, 1 and 2. Let ix  and iy  denote 
country i's production of renewable (green) and fossil (brown) energy, respectively. For the 
consumers, we assume that both types of energy are perfect substitutes. Furthermore, let i ic (x )  and 
i if (y )  be country i's cost functions for producing green and brown energy, respectively, whereas 
i iB (e )  denotes country i's benefit of consuming energy. We assume free trade, no transportation costs, 
and the following properties of the cost and benefit functions: 
i i i i i i i i i i i ic (x ) 0, c (x ) 0, f (y ) 0, f (y ) 0, B (e ) 0, and B (e ) 0.            The market equilibrium condition 
is:  
 
(1) 1 2 1 2 1 2e e x x y y     .  
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As a starting point we consider a situation where the two countries jointly have a target for emissions 
of CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels. As we only consider one type of fossil fuels in this 
theoretical part of the paper, this corresponds to a target ( Y ) for total consumption of fossil fuels:  
 
(2) 1 2y y Y  .  
 
The countries have a common target for the share (α) of renewable green energy in their final con-
sumption: 
 
(3) 1 1 1 2x x (e e ), 0 1        .  
 
Throughout this theoretical analysis we only consider situations where both constraints are binding. 
Hence, (2) and (3) are satisfied with equality.  
 
Total welfare (W) is given by: 
 
(4) i i i i i i
i
W B (e ) c (x ) f (y )   ,  
 
Maximizing  
(4) w.r.t. ei,  xi and yi subject to (1), (2) and (3), yields the following optimality conditions: 
 
(5) 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 1B B c c f f                        ,  
 
where 1  is the shadow cost of the market equilibrium constraint (1), 2  is the shadow cost of the 
fossil fuel target constraint, (2), and 3  is the shadow cost of the renewable target constraint, (3). Let 
* * * * * *
i i i 1 2 3e , x , y , , and    denote the outcome of the optimal solution following from (1), (2), (3) and 
(5), i=1,2.  
 
We see from (5) that the marginal cost of producing green energy must exceed both the marginal 
benefit of consuming energy and the marginal cost of producing fossil fuels in optimum (as 3  and 
2  > 0, and 0 1    by assumption). Furthermore, we see that the marginal benefit of consumption 
is equalized across consumers, the marginal cost of green energy production is equalized across green 
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energy producers, and finally, the marginal cost of fossil fuel production is equalized across fossil fuel 
producers.  
 
In the next sections we consider three different scenarios for achieving the renewable target by the use 
of a green certificate system, given a common competitive energy market and a common competitive 
tradable emissions permits market. The scenarios correspond to i) - iii), described in the introduction.  
2.1. Scenario i): Common target - Common certificate market 
The countries have a common target for the share (α) of renewable energy in their final consumption. 
This implies that all consumers of energy are obliged to purchase α green certificates for each unit of 
energy they consume. Let β denote the unit price on certificates. Renewable energy producers have the 
right to sell one green certificate per unit renewable energy produced. Let p denote the market price on 
energy. Let t denote the market price on emission permits, and let p denote the consumer price on 
energy. The net benefit from consumption (w) in country i is: 
 
(6) i i i iw B (e ) (p )e , i 1,2      
 
As we have assumed that both types of energy are perfect substitutes for the consumers, the consumer 
price cannot differ across energy types.  
 
The producer price on each energy source equals the market price less of any net taxes (taxes minus 
subsidies). The producers of renewable energy also gain β on each unit of energy. Hence, the green 
and brown energy producers’ profit functions, denoted ix and iy , are respectively: 
 
(7) ix i i i(p )x c (x ) i 1,2       
(8) iy i i i(p t)y f (y ) i 1,2       
 
The producer price on energy for fossil fuel producers equals p-t, whereas the producer price on green 
energy equals p+ β. 
 
The first order conditions for consumers’ welfare optimization and producers’ profit maximization are 
found by maximising (6) w.r.t. ei, maximizing (7) w.r.t. to xi, and maximizing (8) w.r.t. to yi: 
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(9) 1 2 1 2 1 2B B c c f t f t p                    
 
Let i i ie (p ),x (p ) and y (p t)    denote the demand and supply functions following from (9). 
 
The renewable target constraint, (3), sets the market equilibrium condition for the certificate market:  
 
(10) 1 2 1 2(e (p )) (e (p )) x (p ) x (p )            
 
By inserting the demand and supply functions following from (9) into (1) and (2) we find the equilib-
rium conditions for p, t and  , denoted *p , *t  and * , respectively from (1), (2) and (10). Hence, *p , 
*t  and *  ensure that the constraints regarding total consumption and production (eq. (1)- (3)) are 
satisfied. Furthermore, we see from (9) that a common green certificate market also ensures the opti-
mal distribution of production and consumption across countries. Thus, it follows from (9) that 
* * * * * * * * *
i i i i i ie (p ) e ,x (p ) x and y (p t ) y       . 
 
Hence, the green energy certificate market ensures the optimal solution, given a target for the share of 
green energy in final energy consumption (eq. (3)).  
2.2. Scenario ii): Differentiated targets – A common certificate market 
In this situation, each country has an individual target for its share of renewable energy in final con-
sumption, αi. There is a common green certificate market. This implies that the producer price on 
green energy equals p  in both countries, as in scenario i), whereas the consumer prices on energy 
( ip  ) differ. Replacing p   with ip   in (6), the first order conditions for consumers’ wel-
fare maximization and producers’ profit maximization are given by: 
 
(11) 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2B B c c f t f t p                      
 
We see from (11), that 1 2 1 2B B for      and 1 2c c  . Hence, we can derive the following 
proposition: 
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Proposition 1: 
Consider a group of countries with a target for a specific share of total renewable energy in 
overall energy consumption. A green certificate market does not lead to a cost-effective 
achievement of the overall target if the individual countries are assigned differentiated targets. 
However, the production of green energy is cost effectively distributed across producers. 
 
When the green certificates are tradable across countries, all green energy producers face the same 
producer price and a cost effective distribution of green energy production is ensured. Differentiated 
targets lead to differentiated consumer price on energy across consumers and the consumption of 
energy is thus not distributed optimally across consumers.  
2.3. Scenario iii): Differentiated targets - National certificate markets  
In this situation, each country has an individual target for its share of renewable energy in final 
consumption αi, and each country has an individual certificate market. Let i  denote the market price 
on certificates in country i. The consumer price on energy in country i is i ip   . Replacing p   
with i ip    in (6) and replacing   with i  in (7), the first order conditions for consumers’ welfare 
maximization and producers’ profit maximization are given by: 
 
(12) 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2B B c c f t f t p                      
 
We see from (12) that the marginal benefit of energy is not equalized across consumers (countries), 
except by chance, as 1 21 2
2 1
B B for      . Furthermore, marginal cost of green energy production is 
not equalized across producers, except by chance, as 1 2c c   for 1 2   . This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: 
Consider a group of countries with a target for a specific share of total renewable energy in 
overall energy consumption. Individual green certificate markets lead to an inefficient 
distribution of green energy production and an inefficient distribution of energy consumption.  
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3. Numerical illustrations 
In order to evaluate the qualitative impact of the alternative scenarios, we need an energy market 
model that captures the main features of the different alternatives, and quantify the impact on main 
economic variables, such as total cost, consumer surplus, producer surplus, energy production and 
prices. To conduct this qualitative evaluation, we use the multi-market energy equilibrium model 
LIBEMOD. The model’s focus is on the electricity and natural gas markets of Western Europe, but it 
also covers global markets for coal and oil. See Golombek et al. (2009) for a documentation of the 
present version of LIBEMOD, and Aune et al. (2008) for a more detailed description of LIBEMOD, 
including data sources.6 
3.1. Detailed description of the numerical model 
LIBEMOD distinguishes between 16 endogenous Western European model countries7, three exoge-
nous model countries which are important for the Western European gas market8 ,and an exogenous 
region containing the rest of world. Only the endogenous model countries have a full set of energy 
markets. However, also the exogenous model countries possess endogenous supply of one or more 
fossil fuels. 
 
As the EU’s Energy and Climate Package covers all of the current 27 EU members, (EU-27), whereas 
LIBEMOD only reports CO2 emissions and green energy production from the Western European 
countries, LIBEMOD has a limitation when it comes to simulating the full effects of EU’s policy. 
However, we believe that LIBEMOD-simulations still provide a good picture of the impact of the 
various designs of green certificate markets in the EU, as LIBEMOD’s endogenous model countries 
cover 85 % and 84 % of EU-27’s energy consumption and production, respectively (Eurostat, 2008).9  
 
                                                     
6 The version of LIBEMOD used in the present paper – LIBEMOD 2000 CCS – differs somewhat from the one documented 
in Aune et al. (2008), the main differences being i) electricity is traded in two (not six) periods over the 24-hour cycle, ii) 
more electricity technologies are available (CCS technologies for coal and gas power plants), and iii) a more aggregated 
representation of coal markets is used.  
7 Austria, Belgium (incl. Luxembourg), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain and northern Ireland, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
8Algeria, Russia and Ukraine 
9 The Renewables Directive is relevant for EEA. Norway is not an EU member, but a member of EEA. Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to include Norway among countries covered by EU’s climate and energy package. Switzerland on the other hand, is 
not a member of EEA. While Switzerland is not yet a part of the EU-ETS trading scheme, they aim to merge their national 
trading scheme with the European emissions trading scheme, see 
http://www.uvek.admin.ch/dokumentation/00474/00492/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=28680. The Renewables Directive, 
article 9 opens for joint projects in production of renewable electricity between EU member states and third countries. We 
therefore also include Switzerland among countries covered by EU’s climate and energy package in our numerical analysis. 
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We have made some adjustment to the targets specified in EU’s Energy and Climate Package to take 
into account that LIBEMOD’s endogenous model countries differ from EU-27. The Renewables Di-
rective sets differentiated national targets for the increase in renewables in each of the Member States, 
which are consistent with a target of at least a 20 % share of energy from renewable sources in the 
Community’s final consumption, see Appendix A. When we sum up the Renewables Directive’s na-
tional targets for LIBEMOD’s endogenous model countries, we find these targets consistent with a 
target of a 19.7 % share of energy from renewable sources in the final consumption in LIBEMOD.10  
 
We have also made an adjustment to incorporate EU’s target of a 20 % reduction in GHG relative to 
1990 levels. This target is achieved partly by a 21 % reduction below 2005 levels from sources cov-
ered by EU’s emission trading scheme (EU-ETS), and partly by differentiated national targets for 
emission from sources not covered by EU-ETS. We find the total target for LIBEMOD’s endogenous 
model countries by assuming a 21 % reduction relative to 2005, of emissions covered by EU-ETS in 
these countries. The sum of emissions reductions for sectors outside EU-ETS are found from summing 
up the differentiated national targets for the LIBEMOD’s endogenous model countries, given in EU 
(2009a).11  
 
As the Renewables Directive is the main focus of this paper, we have simplified the GHG emissions 
policy by assuming that all sources of emissions face the same price on emission, in terms of a com-
mon CO2 tax, and this tax ensures that the target is fulfilled. Furthermore, we only consider emissions 
of CO2, and assume that the percentage G HG reduction targets holds for CO2-emissions. 
 
All markets in LIBEMOD are competitive. In each endogenous model country there is investment in 
energy infrastructure, as well as production, consumption and trade of energy. In equilibrium all arbi-
trage possibilities are exploited and thus price differences for each good reflect cost differences only. 
 
Seven energy goods are included; electricity, biomass, oil, natural gas, lignite, steam coal and coking 
coal. Natural gas and electricity are traded between endogenous model countries as well as a few ex-
ogenous model countries such as Russia. Oil, steam coal and coking coal are traded in global markets. 
                                                     
10 For Norway the national renewable target is set to 68 %. This is found from using the same method as employed by the EU 
for setting the national targets for EU Member States (see EU, 2008a, Annex 6). Point Carbon (2008), finds, by using this 
method that Norway should increase its renewable share with 14.5 percentage points. We apply the same increase in 
renewable share for Norway in our numerical simulations. The national renewable target for Switzerland is set to 0 (see 
footnote 9). 
11 For both Norway and Switzerland the national goals are set to a 20 percent reduction in national non EU-ETS CO2 
emissions in 2020 compared to 2005.  
13 
LIBEMOD offers a detailed description of production of electricity in each model country. In general, 
there are a number of technologies available for production of electricity in existing plants or in new 
plants. For steam coal power and gas power, a producer can install carbon capture and storage in an 
existing plant, or build a new power plant with CCS. 
 
There are four groups of users of energy: Power producers, households/services, industry and trans-
port. The first group represents intermediate demand; power plants demand a fuel as an input in pro-
duction of electricity. This fuel could be steam coal, lignite, natural gas, oil or biomass. The three lat-
ter groups represent end-user demand.  
 
LIBEMOD ignores the use of biomass in other sectors than the electricity sector. As we know that the 
use of biomass (biodiesel and bioethanol) can substitute fossil fuels in the transport sector and biomass 
can substitute gas or coal for heating, we have decided to exogenously determine the use of biomass in 
the transport sector and in the stationary energy sector. EU statistics provide information about the use 
of biomass in 2005 in these sectors for all endogenous model countries.12 We have prolonged this use 
of biomass to 2020. Furthermore, from the EU Renewable Energy Directive we adopt that the use of 
biomass in the EU transport sector increases to 10 per cent of the total energy use in that sector in 
2020. For the stationary energy sector, we assume that the percentage share of biomass in 2020 
corresponds to the percentage renewable targets (19.7 %). The distribution across countries is 
determined by assuming the same percentage point increase from 2005 to 2020 across all countries. In 
total, this gives us a use of renewables in the stationary energy sector in 2020 approximately in line 
with EU’s projections13. The absolute values of biomass in the transport sector and stationary energy 
sector are identical in all three scenarios. We do not consider any trade in biomass across countries. 
However, the biomass used as input factor in the production of electricity is endogenously determined 
in the model.  
3.2. Simulations  
Using the LIBEMOD model, we compare the costs of implementing EU’s renewable target through 
the three different scenarios described in the theoretical model: i) an equal percentage renewable target 
for all countries and EU-wide trade in green certificates system, ii) individual renewable targets and 
EU-wide trade in green certificates and iii) individual renewable targets and no EU-wide trade in 
green certificates. 
                                                     
12 For each country, see Table 7, category “Final consumption of RES (excl. electricity)” in Eurostat (2008) 
13 See EU (2007), page 20, figure “Renewables growth: Heating and cooling projections by 2020”. 
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As a starting point for our analysis, we first simulate a base scenario with no renewable target, but 
with a common EU-wide carbon tax sufficiently high to ensure a 20 % reduction of emissions of 
carbon dioxide in 2020. Thereafter, we simulate the three different scenarios for green certificates 
systems, given both the target for CO2 emissions and the renewable target. Table 1 presents the impact 
of introducing a renewable target through the three different scenarios for green certificates. The 
absolute numbers represent the changes relative to the case with no renewable target (base scenario), 
whereas the percentage numbers in the brackets represents the percentage change in outcome of 
scenario i) and ii) relative to scenario iii). Hence, the percentage numbers show the effects of opening 
up for trade in green certificates, given a renewable target.  
 
From Table 1 we see that opening up for EU-wide trade in green certificates strongly reduces the cost 
of introducing a renewable target compared to domestic certificate trade only. The cost of meeting the 
overall EU target is reduced by 69 % under system ii) compared to system iii). The cost effective 
solution with a common renewable target and EU-wide trade in certificates (system i) reduces the 
costs by 71 % compared to system iii). This tells us that the main driving force to reduce the cost of 
the renewable target is to allow for trade in green certificates.14 Given free trade in green certificates, 
shifting from differentiated national targets to common national targets only reduces the costs further 
by approximately 4 %. 
 
From Table 1, we also see that the introduction of the Renewables Directive causes large changes in 
the producer and consumer surplus.15 The large increase in the producer surplus is mainly caused by 
increased incomes from green certificates. The producers of renewable energy receive an income from 
the green certificate system and therefore increase their producer surplus. We see that the producer 
surplus is very similar under system i) and ii), but is much higher under system iii). This is mainly 
driven by the higher prices on green certificates under scenario iii). The average price of green 
certificates equals € 47 in scenario iii), whereas the common certificate price has fallen to € 26 in 
scenario i) and iii), due to the EU-wide trade in green certificates.16  
 
                                                     
14 Our estimated gains from trade in certificates are somewhat higher than the estimate in EU (2008a), where the costs from 
achieving the renewable and greenhouse gas target are based on simulations using the PRIMES and GAINS models. They 
find that trade in green certificates, given differentiated renewable targets, can reduce costs by € 8 Bn compared with no trade 
in certificates. See table 36 in EU (2008a). Their results are not directly comparable with ours due to different countries being 
included in the analysis and different assumptions about the carbon costs in the non EU ETS sector. 
15 Consumer surplus is here understood as the surplus for all end-users of energy (households, the service industries, other 
industries and transportation). 
16 One certificate being equal to one MWh of renewable energy production. 
15 
The consumer surplus is substantially reduced in all three scenarios. Introducing a renewable target is 
costly for the consumers as they have to pay for green certificates in order to be able to consume 
energy. However, Table 1 shows that the loss in consumer surplus is considerably lower when the 
green certificates are tradable EU-wide. Again, this follows from a lower certificate price with EU-
wide tradable green certificate systems compared to national green certificate systems.  
 
In all three systems there is also a clear decrease in tax income. Taxes included in the model are 
energy taxes, VAT and carbon taxes. The renewable target leads to lower energy consumption in 
general and especially lower consumption of fossil energy. Hence, revenues from energy taxation are 
reduced due to a lower tax base. Furthermore, the renewable target increases the cost of consuming 
fossil energy. The level of the carbon tax necessary to achieve the target for CO2 emissions is therefore 
lower in a situation with a renewable target compared to a situation without. In our model simulation, 
the carbon tax sufficient to achieve the 20 % reduction in carbon emissions target falls from € 59 to € 
52 per tonne CO2 when the renewable target is introduced. As green certificate schemes are revenue 
neutral, there is no “green tax” income to compensate for the loss in energy- and carbon tax 
revenues.17  
 
From Table 1 we see that the choice of scenario for green certificate markets also affects total gross 
consumption of energy. By the introduction of the renewable target through scenario iii), the final 
gross consumption of renewable energy is reduced by 60 Mtoe, which corresponds to a reduction of 4 
percent relative to the base scenario. With EU-wide trade in green certificate, the reduction in gross 
final consumption is 50 % less. Hence, as all scenarios must fulfill the renewable target, the amount of 
renewable energy consumption is larger under EU-wide certificate trade than under domestic 
certificate trade only.  
 
Average producer price of electricity, weighted by each countries production share, is reduced with 
between € 2 and € 3 per MWh, equivalent to a reduction between 4 and 4.5 % in all three scenarios. 
The green certificate market can be viewed as a subsidy to green energy production and a tax on 
energy consumption. Both green energy production subsidies and taxes on consumption reduce 
producer prices (exclusive the certificate price) and the results are thus in accordance with theory. 
 
                                                     
17 Note that our simulation does not take into account how the loss of CO2 tax revenues must be compensated by an increase 
in other producer or consumer taxes, or reduced governmental spending. 
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The effect on the end-user electricity price (electricity price plus certificate price) by introducing the 
green certificate market is not given from theory (see e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001, Bye, 2003 
and Fischer, 2006). Depending on the slope of the nonrenewable energy supply curve relative to the 
renewable energy supply curve, the combination of a tax and a subsidy might lead to both increasing 
and decreasing end-user electricity prices. In our numerical model, the average end-user price on 
electricity, weighted by consumption, increases as a result of the renewable target being implemented. 
The increase is more than twice as large with national targets and no trade in green certificates as with 
trade in certificates.  
 
Table 1: Effects of different implementations of the Renewables Directive in 2020 (annually). 
  
 
Domestic certificate 
trade only 
EU-wide trade in certificates  
Number in brackets express the percentage changes 
relative to scenario iii) 
 
System iii) 
Differentiated national 
targets and no EU-wide 
trade in green 
certificates 
System ii)  
Differentiated national 
targets and EU-wide trade 
in green certificates 
System i)  
Common renewable 
target and EU-wide trade 
in green certificates 
Cost of introducing the renewable 
target (M€) 19522 5968 (-69 %) 5745 (-71 %) 
Change in producer surplus (M€) 173895 84938 (-51 %) 84336 (-52 %) 
Change in consumer surplus (M€) -120535  -49401 (-59 %)  -48761 (-60 %) 
Change in taxes (M€) -33838  -29569 (-13 %)  -29831 (-12 %) 
Change in carbon tax rate (€ per 
tonne CO2) 
-7.50  -7.44 (-0.8 %)  -7.44 (-0.8 %) 
Change in renewable energy 
consumption (Mtoe) 30 34 (11 %) 33 (11 %) 
Change in gross final consumption 
of energy (Mtoe) -60  -29 (-51 %)  -30 (-50 %) 
Change in electricity production 
(TWh) -90  -34 (-62 %)  -26 (-71 %) 
Change in end-user electricity 
prices (€ MWh) 7.39 3.35 (-55 %) 2.81 (-62 %) 
Change in electricity prices  
(€/MWh) -2.49  -2.74 (10 %)  -2.73 (9 %) 
M€ = million 2007-€. 
 
All our numerical results regarding different ways to implement the renewable target depend heavily 
on our assumptions about available technologies to ensure both the carbon reduction and renewable 
energy target. Our numerical model comprises the potential for using CCS technology, and this 
technology will be implemented on all new coal fired power plants for CO2-taxes above 31 € per tonne 
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CO2. Obviously, there are uncertainties related to the performance of this, still immature, technology. 
If it turns out that the CCS technology will be too costly to implement or that it is not an accepted 
abatement technology due to the uncertainties related to safe storage of CO2, the cost of reaching a 
20 % reduction in carbon emissions increases substantially. Due to the corresponding high carbon 
prices, renewable energy become more profitable and there is no added cost by implementing the 
renewable target as long as there is EU-wide trade in green certificates (the certificate price is zero). 
Without trade in certificates the total cost of reaching the renewable target is € 4225 million, i.e. the 
added cost of the renewable target is substantially lower than with CCS.  
3.3. Results by country 
The costs of the different ways of implementing the renewable target differ substantially between 
countries. In Figure 1 we see the cost reduction across countries from having EU-wide trade in green 
certificates. Cost in scenario i) and ii) are compared to the situation under scenario iii).  
 
In scenario ii) and iii), the differentiated national renewable targets are identical, but scenario ii) 
allows for EU-wide certificate trade, whereas scenario iii) does not. Access to an EU-wide market is in 
itself beneficial for all countries. It is particularly beneficial for countries that become large traders in 
the certificate market. However, EU-wide trade in green certificates affects the equilibrium prices on 
all energy sources. Due to these terms of trade effects, some countries are worse off in scenario ii) 
compared to scenario iii). 
 
Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden will benefit most from a shift from scenario iii) to scenario ii).  
We see from Figure 2 that Italy has a high national price on green certificates in scenario iii). The high 
price is a reflection of high domestic costs of green energy production. Hence, the cost of meeting 
their renewable target is substantially reduced when they get access to green certificates at a much 
lower price in scenario ii). For Finland, Norway and Sweden, the gains from an EU-wide market for 
certificates follow from their capacity to produce green energy at low costs. We see from Figure 2, 
that their price on green certificates is zero under scenario iii), even though they have national targets 
way above the average (see appendix A). This indicates that these countries will become large sellers 
of certificates in scenario ii) and exploit the gains from trade.  
 
Whether a country is better off in scenario ii) than in scenario i) depends mainly on whether its 
national target in scenario ii) is above or below the common target in scenario i). Sweden and Norway 
have the highest national targets, set at 40 % and 68 %, respectively, in our model. Surely, they will 
18 
both benefit substantially by a replacement of their national targets with the common targets of 19.7 % 
in scenario i).  
 
Figure 1:  Countries’ yearly cost reduction in system i) and ii) compared to system iii), as share 
of their GDP (2009) 
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Figure 2: Green certificate prices. €/MWh. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The EU has agreed on differentiated renewable targets across Member States to achieve the renewable 
target of a 20 % share of renewables in the EU’s total final energy consumption by 2020. We have 
shown that differentiated national targets do not lead to a cost effective implementation of EU’s 
19 
renewable target (see proposition 1 and 2). However, an important result from our numerical model is 
that, given differentiated national targets, the overall cost of achieving the EU’s renewable target can 
be cut by almost 70 per cent if the Member States are allowed to trade green certificates. The 
Renewable Energy Directive (EU, 2009b) allows for so called statistical transfers, which means that 
Member States may meet their national renewable targets by financing green energy production in 
other countries. Our paper shows the great potential for cost savings by developing this system into a 
well functioning green certificate market. Our numerical model also shows that the various designs of 
green certificate markets have great influence on the distribution of costs across countries. Hence, 
allowing for trade in green certificates (or statistical transfers) alters the distribution of costs across 
countries. If the EU also has a target for distribution of costs across countries, a development of a 
green certificate market may also necessitate a redistribution of the differentiated renewable targets 
across countries, if financial transfers/compensations are excluded. But then again, a redistribution of 
national targets affects the efficiency loss following from the corresponding differentiated consumer 
prices on energy. This is the well known result that distributional concerns must (in general) be 
separated from efficiency concerns when designing cost effective policy instruments.  
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Appendix 
 
National renewable shares in LIBEMOD for 2005 and overall national targets in LIBEMOD for 
the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy in 2020 
 Renewable share (2005) Renewable target share (2020) 
Austria 26.4 % 37.1 % 
Belgium 1.8 % 12.6 % 
Switzerland 20.2 % 0.0 % 
Germany 4.4 % 16.6 % 
Denmark 12.1 % 25.1 % 
Spain  7.5 % 18.8 % 
Finland  23.9 % 33.4 % 
France 8.6 % 21.3 % 
United Kingdom 1.2 % 14.9 % 
Greece 6.8 % 17.9 % 
Ireland 2.1 % 15.0 % 
Italy 4.4 % 16.2 % 
The Netherlands 1.3 % 12.9 % 
Norway 53.4 % 67.9 % 
Portugal 17.8 % 28.3 % 
Sweden 30.9 % 40.1 % 
 
 
 
